From Quartz Gooner : Why did Wenger replace 4-4-2 power football ?
Hi Myles,
Steve Green asks why Wenger shifted from 4-4-2 power football, to 4-2-3-1 tippy tappy football with smaller players.
You argue that we lost irreplaceable players when the Invincibles were broken up from 2004 – 2007.
That is true, some of the Invincibles had a unique skillset.
Also we refused to spend the money to replace them.
But it is also worth noting a Times newspaper article from 2006, that I am unable to provide a link to because of the Times paywall.
It claimed that players’ total distances per game had increased by a small amount over the previous five seasons.
More importantly, it claimed that the amount of time players spent running at over 75% or more of maximum speed had increased by 40%.
So players were running further, and at a higher pace, for much longer than in previous years.
I believe Wenger felt that to capitalise on this trend, he needed to emulate Barcelona and use smaller shorter thinner players than before.
He could make up the shortfall in two ways: Compensating for these smaller players’ relative lack of natural physical strength by using the increasing efficiency of sports science training, maximising core strength without massive muscle gain, and signing highly skilled technical players.
The visible examples of this model were Flamini and Nasri.
The theory has not entirely worked in practice though, because we have not had enough players as skilled as Messi, Xavi and Iniesta, and because the English League is more physical than the Spanish one.
Just one of many reasons we end up fighting for fourth place, instead of for the title.
Myles says :
Thanks, Quartz.
You are a true gem.
The 2007-2008 season was the last time Wenger did something ruthless and brilliant.
He coldly sidelined Gilberrto to make Fabregas-Flamini-Hleb the hub of his team.
He saw something in training, and in pre-season, and boldly went with those three dictating the way Arsenal would play.
A born technocrat who loves athletes, he had the data at his fingertips.
That decision, which I explained in detail in The Professor, was as radical as selling Merson the dribbler to speed up the Arsenal attack.
In the summer of 1997, Merson had been sold to Middlesbrough for £5m and Overmars had arrived from Ajax for £5m.
In 2007-08, Flamini’s combative energy gave the team tempo, Fabregas gave it brains and goals, while Hleb had the ball-holding skills to link them and the rest of the attack.
Those three loved playing together and enjoyed each other’s company. In the afternoons they used to hang out together in a Spanish restaurant in Enfield.
That sports science data, and that that high-tempo style, put Arsenal top of the table until February.
Wenger’s laptop looked like winning the league.
And then Eduardo’s leg was smashed to pieces.